CONSTRUCTING PEACE WITH MEDIA: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IN GLOBAL NEWS TRENDS

YAKUBU OZOHU-SULEIMAN & MD SIDIN AHMAD ISHAK _

ABSTRACT

We juxtaposed war and peace journalism, based on Galtung's classification, to examine how leading providers of international news—the BBC World, CNN International, Al-Jazeera English and Press TV are responding to the call for a shift from war to peace agenda in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We coded for occurrences, approaches and language-use to determine the salient indicators of war and peace journalism. Overall, our finding shows a significant support for Galtung's description of war journalism compared to peace journalism. We concluded that peace journalism in global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at present is more engendered by events of the peace process and we-are-peace-loving propaganda than conscious editorial drive towards peace. The notable presence of indicators of peace journalism offers a reason to believe that media are able to shape peace in Israel/Palestine through a more conscious application of peace journalism model, but also calls for concern on how bias might be represented in peace journalism.

Keywords: Peace journalism, war journalism, newsworthiness, international news, propaganda

INTRODUCTION

Over forty studies dating from early 1960s to mid-1980s show that media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was characterized by qualitative inaccuracy and disproportionate favourability towards Israelis and Palestinians (see Kressel 1987). Recent studies have similarly reported evidences of media's distorting coverage that misleads public understanding of the conflict (Philo & Berry 2004; Wolfsfeld 2004; Viser 2003; Kandil 2009; Raz 2008; Karim 2009; Tsfati & Cohen 2005; Alimi 2007; Kalb & Saivetz 2007).

Considered "a double-edged sword that can serve as frightful weapon of violence or instrument of conflict resolution" (Howard 2002), concerns have grown on how the media can play constructive roles that can help in resolving conflicts and promoting peace. These concerns, which grew out of the discontents of war journalism, prescribe a shift to the peace

correspondence, which is offered as a "broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation" (McGoldrick & Lynch 2000), and in which the journalists rather take the advocacy and interpretative approach in reporting a conflict by concentrating on stories that highlights peace initiatives, tones down ethnic and religious differences, prevents further conflict, focuses on the structure of society; and promotes conflict resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation (Galtung 1998).

Following this development, researchers have categorized and defined the characters of war and peace journalism in media coverage of conflicts (Galtung 1998; McGoldrick & Lynch 2000; Howard 2003). However, while an impressive amount of research on war journalism exists, very few attempts have been made to operationalise peace journalism research. As a Consequence, the literature has remained largely normative and prescriptive. Our interest in this paper is to contribute in operationalising peace journalism research by examining how influential western and non-western media networks – BBC World, CNN International, Al-Jazeera English and Press TV have responded to the call for peace journalism in reporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

WAR AND PEACE IN JOURNALISM OF ATTACHMENT

Until less than a decade ago, transnational western media had been the only major news sources on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the most of global audiences. For this reason, most of early studies focused mainly on how western media covered the conflict, with barrage of conflicting findings by pro-Israel and pro-Arab researchers accusing the US media of inaccurate coverage and disproportionate favorability towards the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.¹

Evidences in recent studies are clearer in showing that western media have actually been supportive of Israel. Viser (2003) for example analyzed the indicators of bias in the portrayal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by *New York Times* and Israel's *Haaretz* newspaper, and found that *New York Times* demonstrated pro-Israeli bias more than Israel's local *Haaretz* newspaper. The following year in 2004, Glasgow Media Group published its study of British media coverage of the second Palestinian intifada and its impact on public understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Drawing on content analysis and survey data, the Group reported in its "Bad News from Israel" that there was a preponderance of official Israeli perspectives on BBC1, and that United States politicians who support Israel were very strongly featured. Viewers' understanding of the conflict, according to this study, was distorted to such extent that "most did not know that Palestinians had been forced from their homes and land when Israel was established in 1948...; so they thought that the Palestinians were the occupiers" (Philo & Berry 2004).

A study of impartiality of the BBC News coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict similarly found that the network produced "incomplete" and "misleading" coverage that rarely featured the hardships of Palestinians living under occupation, and consistently portrayed Palestinians as committed to Israelis destruction (BBC 2006).

Studies have also been conducted on how non-western media such as Aljazeera Arabic and English TV have responded to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While a few were survey-based perception study of the networks' coverage attitude (Fahmy & Johnson 2007; El-Nawawy & Powers 2008), most were textual and content analysis-based comparison of their coverage with those of western media in terms of newsworthiness, bias, use of language, and influence of political landscape. Kandil (2009) for example conducted a comparative

corpus-based critical discourse analysis and found that Aljazeera Arabic corpus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contains more than twice the number of words in the BBC corpus and more than five times the number of words in CNN corpus on the same conflict. While this finding appears as simple as some would expect, the implication, according to Kandil, is that followers of CNN will usually get significantly less information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compare to followers of the BBC and Aljazeera Arabic. Also of interest in Kandil's study, is his findings regarding the variations in media description of the agents of violence, method of violence and outcome/victims of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The notable agents of Israeli-Palestinian violence according to Aljazeera Arabic are the Israelis, while according to the BBC they are Palestinians, Islam and Hamas. According to CNN, the agents of violence in the conflict are terrorists. On the methods of violence, Aljazeera Arabic noted "firing" and "operation", while the BBC noted "suicide", "rockets" and "intifada". The CNN also noted "suicide", "rockets" and "blasts" among others. On the outcomes/victims of violence, Aljazeera Arabic will say, "was/were martyred" while the BBC will say they were "killed" and CNN will say they were "killed" or "wounded" (Kandil 2009: 56).

In a similar study that compared how ties between government and the media influences framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Aljazeera English, CNN and Haaretz Newspaper, Raz (2008) found that CNN was extremely US policy-oriented in reporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "Although CNN was extremely fact-based and neutral, it had an underlying Israeli focus and latent American bias. The coverage seemed to have an American agenda in framing the Middle East conflict" (Raz 2008: 8–9).

Raz (2008) was unable to empirically locate Qatar's political influence on Aljazeera English, which she hypothesized was likely to produce censored and less critical coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of limited journalistic autonomy arising from "influences from authoritarian Qatar regime". However, "Aljazeera's titles often used sensationalized or critical diction…and delivers a rather clear anti-Israeli agenda with one-sided advocacy" (Raz 2008, 9–10).

Sensationalized coverage includes the use of graphic images in reporting sufferings and death in a conflict. Western media ethics discourages the use of war images that depicts suffering and death while pre-image warning is considered sufficient for the use of such images in contemporary Arab media ethics. In a web-based survey that examined how Arab viewers of Aljazeera Arabic TV perceive the network's visual messages depicting graphic images of suffering and death in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq war, Fahmy and Johnson (2007) found that there was an overwhelming viewers' support for Aljazeera's broadcast of graphic images. A significant proportion of viewers, according to Fahmy and Johnson, believed that Aljazeera was providing a true and better coverage of the conflict by broadcasting images of death and sufferings.

In another content analysis that compared citation of Israeli and Palestinian sources in Aljazeera English and the BBC, and the prevalence with which each side was portrayed as instigating or responding to violence, Arab Media Watch found that both networks devoted more words to Israeli sources, and that both networks portrayed Israeli violence as response to Palestinian violence (Karim 2009).

Unlike other influential global news networks, Press TV has not attracted research attention perhaps not only because it is new, but also because many seems to take it for granted that the state-funded network unambiguously serves the propaganda interests of Iran's pro-Palestinian regime in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of course, this is an interesting aspect of our study.

Media partisanship in a conflict or "journalism of attachment", as Ruigrok (2008) calls it, regards the reporter as a participant in the conflict, and is potentially capable of exacerbating such conflict and making it difficult to resolve. In this realization, scholars are exploring the feasibility of Galtung's peace journalism proposal in what Tehranian (2002) described as "alternative media system that will promote peace journalism for international and intercultural understanding". According to Galtung (1998), by taking an advocacy, interpretative approach, the peace journalist concentrates on stories that highlights peace initiatives; tone down ethnic and religious differences, prevent further conflict, focus on the structure of society; and promotes conflict resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation.

A few attempts have been made to examine how the media communicates peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Wu, Sylvester and Hamilton (2002) for example found that the *Philadelphia Enquirer* provided its readers with "ample information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" and was "continuously reporting major developments in the peace process and providing rich background on US role". Warshel (2007) also reported that Disney's television programme for Israeli-Palestinian children—*Rechov SumSum/Shara'a SimSim* has had significant effect in fostering cross-cultural understanding between Israeli and Palestinian children.

However, Levin's (2009) test of indexing and zero-sum hypotheses on Israeli newspaper coverage of the Oslo peace process reported that the zero-sum hypothesis was a more accurate model to describe the coverage. Levin's report is consistent with that of Wolfsfeld (2004) who earlier found that the media played destructive role in the Oslo peace process, while they played constructive role in the Ireland and the Israeli-Jordanian peace process. Of course it is clear that media are not operating on a common ground, which is why Wolfsfeld concluded that media's attitude towards peace varies according to the media and political environment.

Outside Israel/Palestine, there have been cases where the index hypothesis offered a better model for explaining media treatment of conflict issues. For example, the Studio Ijambo project was found to have had positive impact on inter-ethnic relations, social and political mobilization, political elite negotiations, public institutions, and mass or elite conflict behavior in post conflict peace building in Rwanda (Hagos 2001). Paluck (2007) similarly reported that radio had positive impact in communicating social norms and influencing behaviors that contributed to intergroup tolerance and reconciliation in post-conflict Rwanda. Lopata (2009) also reported high public appreciation of the quality indicators of peace journalism such as diversity of sources and viewpoints that characterized local media's role in post-conflict Liberia.

Although the media are usually not independent of other influential participants – political, commercial and policy actors in framing a conflict, the foregoing cases implies that they (the media) reserves the ultimate decision on whether contents should be geared towards supporting peace or promoting conflict. Of particular interest is selective role played by media towards peace in the Israeli-Jordanian, Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Wolfsfeld 2004). Such role naturally begets the assumption that media are consciously able to shift emphasis from war to peace by applying more coverage to the character of peace in conflict environments. Placing this assumption in the context of increasing call to peace journalism, we raised the following questions to examine how the BBC World, CNN International, AlJazeera English and Press TV covered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the immediate past.

- RQ1: In what comparative measures are war and peace journalism reflected global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and are there differences in framing between western and non-western media?
- RQ2: What are the salient indicators, in terms of approach, of war and peace journalism in global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and are there differences in framing between western and non-western media?
- RQ3: What are the salient indicators, in terms of language use, of war and peace journalism in global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and are there differences, in terms of frequency, between western and non-western media?

METHOD

The study is based on content analysis of 1,200 stories (n=300/network) of western and nonwestern media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involving the BBC World News, CNN International, Al-Jazeera English and Press TV. The study covered the period between January 1 and December 31 2011, except for Al-Jazeera English where data was augmented with 2010 coverage because of difficulty in accessing some news transcripts within study period. Unit of analysis were article (RQs1 & 2) and word (RQ3). The period covered in the study represented the most recent experience, slightly departed from studies that focused on the war aspect of media coverage of the conflict. Content data were obtained from broadcast transcripts through the web archives of respective media outfits and Lexis-Nexis data base.

Basically, the study juxtaposed war and peace journalism (based on Galtung's classification) to compare the extents and approaches to framing in media coverage of the conflict. Thus, four major content categories were developed. These include category 1: "Occurrence of war/peace journalism"; category 2: "Approach to peace journalism"; category 3: "Approach to war journalism" and category 4: "Use of war journalism languages". Category 1 was coded to answer research questions 1. Categories 2 and 3 were coded to answer questions 2, while category 4 was coded to answer question 3. The frames coded into the categories 2 and 3 were based on 14 indicators, 7 each of war and peace journalism as defined across existing literature.

Coding was both manual and computer-aided. Manual coding was applied in places where article was used as unit of analysis. Where words were used as units of analysis, computer-based "Concordance" was used in quantifying the words and conducting Key Word in Context (KWIC) analysis. Cases of multiple frames occurring in an article were resolved by initially recording each occurrence of a frame as 1, such that at the end, each article (unit of analysis) is coded into the category based on the frame that had the highest occurrence in the article. Drawing on existing literature, (Lee & Maslog 2005), this was done to avoid violating the rule of coding one unit of analysis into only one category at a time. Data was analysed with SPSS16.0.

Coding involved two coders, and inter-coder reliability was tested with *ReCal2* webbased instrument. Results ranged between 80 and 93.3 for per cent agreement; .59 and .86 for Scott's *Pi*; .59 and .86 for Cohen's kappa; .60 and .86 for Krippendorff's Alpha across the major categories for all the networks. A reliability test that yield Kappa coefficient of .21 and .40 is considered fair, while a test that yield .41 and .60 is considered moderate. A range of between .61 and .80 kappa coefficient is considered substantial (Landis & Koch cited in Stemler 2001: 6). Based on this benchmark, inter-coder reliability in this study has ranged between medium and substantial reliability scale.

RESULTS

RQ1: Framing of War and Peace Journalism

We drew on our coding for occurrences of war and peace journalism frames to answer our first research question. Table 1 contains the basic descriptive statistics of the distribution of war and peace journalism across the media networks.

	Peace	War	Total	Mean	Std. Deviation
Al-Jazeera English	185 (61.7)	115 (38.3)	300	1.38	.487
BBC World News	135 (45.0)	165 (55.0)	300	1.55	.498
CNN International	140 (46.7)	160 (53.3)	300	1.53	.500
Press TV	97 (32.3)	203 (67.7)	300	1.68	.469
ALL NETWORKS	557 (46.4)	643 (53.6)	1200	1.54	.499

Table 1: Distributions of Peace and War Journalism Frames n (%)

Overall, global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period of this investigation reflected a significantly higher framing of war journalism compared to peace journalism $x^2(1, n=1200) = 6.163$, p<0.05 (Table 1). However, there were important variations within the individual networks on how the two frames competed in media coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. Al-Jazeera English for example reflected a significantly higher framing of peace journalism frames than war journalism $x^2(1, n=300) = 16.333$, p<.001. Press TV, on the reverse, reflected a significantly higher framing of war journalism than peace journalism within the period investigated $x^2(1, n=300) = 37.453$, p<.001.

It is noteworthy that Al-Jazeera English produced the highest framing of peace journalism among all the networks while Press TV produced the highest framing of war journalism among all the networks investigated in this study.

War journalism framing also superseded peace journalism framing in the BBC World coverage of the conflict, though there was no significant difference in the occurrences of two frames $x^2(1, n=300) = 3.000$, p=.083. This means that peace journalism offered a tight contest with war journalism in the BBC World coverage of the conflict within the period investigated.

CNN-International's coverage was similar to that of the BBC World in that it reflected war journalism framing, which also superseded its peace journalism framing within the period investigated. There was also no significant difference in CNN's framing of war and peace journalism framing in the conflict $x^2(1, n=300) = 1.333$, p=.248.

Differences in Framing between Networks

The foregoing results show the relative occurrences of war and peace journalism within the individual media networks. The comparison here is between western and non-western networks based on individual performance.

• Press TV vs. BBC World

Earlier, our analysis had shown that both Press TV and the BBC World produced higher framing of war journalism than peace journalism in their individual coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. However, framing of war journalism was higher in Press TV (67.7%) compared to the BBC World (55.0%), while framing of peace journalism was higher in the BBC World (45.0%) compared to Press TV (32.3%). Further analysis shows that there is no significant difference in

the occurrences or framing of war journalism and peace journalism between Press TV and the BBC World $x^2(1, n=300) = .008, p=.93; f=.005, p=.931$.

• Al-Jazeera English vs. BBC World

Our analysis had shown that framing of peace journalism was significantly higher than framing of war journalism in Al-Jazeera English coverage. In the BBC World, framing of war journalism was higher, though not significantly, than framing of peace journalism. Comparing the two networks, the BBC World recorded higher framing of war journalism (55.0%) than Al-Jazeera English (38.3%), while Al-Jazeera English recorded higher framing of peace journalism (61.7%) than the BBC World (45.0%). Further analysis shows that Al-Jazeera English and the BBC World differed significantly in framing war and peace journalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict $x^2(1, n=300)=5.986$, p<0.05; f=-.141, p<0.05.

• Press TV vs. CNN International

Our analysis had earlier shown that CNN International recorded higher framing of war journalism than peace journalism in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. Framing of war journalism was also higher than peace journalism in Press TV as earlier reported. Comparing the two media networks (Table 1), framing of war journalism was higher in Press TV (67.7%) compared to CNN International (53.3%), while framing of peace journalism was higher in CNN International (46.7%) compared to Press TV (32.3%). Further analysis shows that there is no significant difference in the framing of war and peace journalism between the Press TV and CNN International within the period investigated in this study $x^2(1, n=300)=.457$, p=.499; f=.039, p=.499.

• Al-Jazeera English vs. CNN International

Framing of war journalism was higher, though not significantly, than peace journalism in CNN International. In Al-Jazeera English, framing of peace journalism was significantly higher than war journalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as earlier reported (Table 1). Comparing the two media networks, CNN International produced higher framing of war journalism (160 or 53.3%) compared to Al-Jazeera English (115 or 38.3%), whereas Al-Jazeera English produced higher framing of peace journalism (185 or 61.7%) compared to CNN International (140 or 46.7%). Further analysis shows that Al-Jazeera English and CNN International differed significantly in framing war and peace journalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated $x^2(1, n=300)=4.255$, p<0.05; f= .119, p<0.05.

RQ2: Approach to Peace Journalism

Overall, approach to peace journalism in news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was dominated by the proactive indicators. Out of 557 stories framed as peace journalism in all the media networks, 211 stories (37.9%) took the proactive approach (Table2). Based on article as unit of analysis, a story is considered proactive when it anticipates and starts reporting before war breaks out.

The second most salient indicator of peace journalism in overall news coverage of the conflict was multi-party-oriented stories. Out of 557 stories framed as peace journalism in all the media networks, 96 (17.2%) stories took the multi-party approach. A multi-party-oriented

story does not limit the conflict to the two conflicting sides. Instead it seeks out solutions by focusing on the wider involvement and implications of the conflict.

Other salient indicators of peace journalism such as "people-oriented" and "winwin-oriented" stories equally made noticeable presence in overall news coverage with 75 (13.5%) stories and 63 (11.3%) stories respectively of the overall media approach to peace journalism within the period investigated. The weakest indicator of peace journalism was the non-partisan frames, which took only 8 (1.4%) of overall media approach to peace journalism within the period investigated. A possible reason for the weakness of this frame is the divided attachment of the media to the conflict parties, which we shall explain under discussion of results.

Variations in Approach to Peace Journalism within Networks

At the individual levels, there were slight variations in approach to framing peace journalism. Distribution of approach to peace journalism was made across 7 frames of peace journalism. The presentation here is based on the three most salient indicators of peace journalism in each media network.

• Al-Jazeera English

Out of the 185 peace journalism stories produced by Al-Jazeera English, 62 (33.5%) stories took the proactive approach, while 49 (26.5%) stories took the multi-party approach. People-oriented stories took 42 (22.7%) of peace journalism frames in Al-Jazeera English. Thus, proactive, multi-party-oriented and people-oriented stories were the three most salient indicators of peace journalism in terms of approach in Al-Jazeera English coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated in this study (Table 2).

• BBC World News

The BBC World produced 135 (45.0%) peace journalism stories. The most prominent approaches to peace journalism, invariably the most salient indicators of peace journalism in the BBC World were proactive stories (49 or 36.3%), win-win-oriented stories (27 or 20%) and people-oriented stories (15 or 11.1%). The general distribution of BBC World's contents across the 7 frames of peace journalism can be viewed in Table 2.

CNN International

CNN framed 140 (46.7%) of its 300 stories as peace journalism. The networks most prominent approaches to peace journalism were the proactive approach 61 (43.6%), win-win-oriented stories (27 or 19.3%) and agreement-oriented stories (22 or 15.7%). Invariably proactive stories, win-win-oriented stories and agreement-oriented stories were the strongest indicators of peace journalism in CNN International coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated.

• Press TV

Press TV notably produced the lowest amount of peace journalism stories (97 or 32.3%) among the global news media whose coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were examined in this study. Out of its 97 peace journalism stories, 39 (40.2%) took the proactive approach while 21 (21.6%) focused on the invisible effects of the war.

	Table 2: Distributions of Approaches to Peace and War Journalism across Media Networks n (%)	ions of Appr	oaches to Pea	ice and War Jo	ournalism acı	oss Media Ne	tworks n (%)	
		Al-Jazeera English	BBC World	CNN International	Press TV	Western Networks	Non-Western Networks	All Networks
Peace Journalism	Proactive Invisible effects of war People-oriented Agreement-oriented Win-win-oriented Multi-party-oriented Non-partisan	62 (33.5)*** 11 (5.9) 42 (22.7)* 14 (7.6) 5 (2.7) 49 (26.5)** 2 (1.1)	49 (36.3)*** 10 (7.4) 15 (11.1) 14 (10.4) 27 (20.0)** 17 (12.6)* 3 (2.2)	61 (43.6)*** 6 (4.3) 12 (8.6) 22 (15.7)* 27 (19.3)** 10 (7.1) 2 (1.4)	39 (40.2)*** 21 (21.6)** 6 (6.2) 4 (4.1) 20 (20.6)* 1 (1.0)	110 (40.0)*** 16 (5.8) 27 (9.8) 36 (13.1)* 54 (19.6)** 27 (9.8) 5 (1.8)	101 (35.8)*** 32(11.3) 48 (17.0)* 20 (7.1) 9 (3.2) 69 (24.5)** 3 (1.1)	211 (37.9)*** 48 (8.6) 75 (13.5)* 56 (10.1) 63 (11.3) 96 (17.2)** 8 (1.4)
War Journalism	Reactive Visible effects of war Elite-oriented Zero-sum-oriented Two-party-oriented Differences-oriented Partisan	x =3.24 S=2.026 31 (27.0)** 34 (29.6)*** 8 (7.0) 14 (12.2) 2 (1.7) 4 (3.5) 22 (19.1)*	$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{x} = 3.17\\ S = 1.980\\ 25 \ (15.2)^{*}\\ 21 \ (12.7)\\ 6 \ (3.6)\\ 41 \ (24.8)^{***}\\ 23 \ (13.9)\\ 19 \ (11.5)\\ 30 \ (18.2)^{**} \end{array}$	T =2.90 S=1.898 21 (13.1) 10 (6.2) 17 (10.6) 41 (25.6)*** 36 (22.5)** 10 (6.2) 25 (15.6)*	$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{x} = 2.78 \\ S = 2.017 \\ 82 (40.4)^{***} \\ 16 (7.9) \\ 26 (12.8)^{*} \\ 9 (4.4) \\ 2 (1.0) \\ 8 (3.9) \\ 60 (29.6)^{**} \end{array}$	x =3.03 S=1.940 46 (14.2) 31 (9.5) 23 (7.1) 82(25.2)*** 59 (18.2)** 29 (8.9) 55 (16.9)*	x =3.08 S=2.031 59 (15.5)*** 50 (15.7) 34 (10.7)* 23 (7.2) 4 (1.3) 12(3.8) 82 (25.8)**	2 = 3.06 S=1.985 159 (24.7)*** 81 (12.6) 57(8.9) 105 (16.3)* 63 (9.8) 41 (6.4) 137 (21.3)**
		$\frac{\sum \eta = 115(100)}{\overline{\mathbf{x}}} = 10.19$ S=2.224	$\frac{\sum \eta = 165(100)}{\overline{\mathbf{x}} = 11.17}$ S=2.035	$\frac{\sum n=160 \ (100)}{\overline{\mathbf{X}}=11.19}$ S=1.845	$\frac{\sum n=203(100)}{\overline{a}=10.48}$ S=2.582	$\frac{\sum n=325(100)}{\bar{x}=11.18}$ S=1.941	$\frac{\sum n = 318(100)}{\overline{\mathbf{x}} = 10.37}$ S=2.459	$\frac{\sum n = 643(100)}{\overline{x} = 10.78}$ S=2.247

Constructing Peace with Media

55

۰

*Salient indicators (according to strength of indication)

The third most salient indicator of peace journalism in Press TV was the multi-partyoriented stories (20 or 20.6%).

Differences in Approach to Peace Journalism between Networks

A close look at the distribution of approach or salient indicators of peace journalism (Table 2) shows that the media networks were similar in framing peace journalism in many respects. For example all the networks were proactive, while some of them individually shared the characteristics of framing multi-party, win-win-oriented and people-oriented peace journalism stories. However, because the percentage intensity of the framing differs among the networks, we probed further to know how western and non-western networks differed in reflecting peace journalism.

• Press TV vs. BBC World

There was no significant difference in approach to peace journalism between Press TV and the BBC World $x^2(30, n=300) = 22.737$, p=.826; $\phi_{c=}321$, p=.826. It should be noted that in this analysis our focus is on the approach used by the media networks in framing peace journalism, unlike previous analysis where we focused on occurrences of peace and war journalism frames per article unit. Media networks might differ significantly in their records of war and peace journalism frames per article unit, but might not differ the same way in the approach they used in framing. According to our result here, this was the case with Press TV and the BBC World both of who were similar in framing proactive and multi-party-oriented peace journalism stories.

• Al-Jazeera vs. BBC World

There was also no significant difference in approach to peace journalism between Al-Jazeera English and the BBC World $x^2(36, n=300) = 44.627, p=.153; \varphi_c=.319, p=.153$. This is not surprising because the two networks had indicated similarities in approach to framing peace journalism by focusing on proactive and multi-party-oriented stories.

• Press TV vs. CNN International

Our analysis also show no evidence of significant disagreement between Press TV and CNN International in terms of approach to peace journalism $x^2(30, n=300)=28.775, p=.529; \varphi_c=.346, p=.529$. Like CNN International, Press TV's strongest approach to peace journalism was proactive stories. The two media networks were also similarly weakest in framing non-partisan stories (Table 2). So a significant difference in approach to peace journalism between the two networks was not expected.

• Al-Jazeera English vs. CNN International

There was no significant difference in approach to peace journalism between Al-Jazeera English and CNN International $x^2(1, n=300) = 26.554$, p=.875; $\varphi_c = .216$, p=.875. The high similarities in approach to peace journalism between Al-Jazeera English and CNN International captured in this statistics occurred mainly in the networks' usage of proactive frames, which was the strongest indicator of peace journalism in their coverage of the conflict. Other areas of similarities between the networks are summarized on Table 2.

RQ2: Approach to War Journalism

Out of 1,200 articles analysed, 643 (53.6%) were framed as war journalism. As our coding reveals, war journalism was dominated by reactive frames which took 159 (24.7%) of the approach to war journalism in overall news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the four media networks within the period investigated. A war journalism story is considered reactive when it focuses on moments of the conflict or when it waits for the war to break out before reporting it. Usually, a reactive story will not have any far antecedent suggesting that the events of conflict it focus on were going to happen. In another sense, it is possible that the conflict was covered proactively by reporting events that signifies the possibility of such war or conflict, but when the reports are situated close to the conflict or war moments, it can be considered reactive (cf. Lee & Maslog 2005: 325).

The dominance of reactive indicators of war journalism in overall news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated might be explained in the protracted and persistent character of the conflict. A conflict of this nature is usually loaded with surprising variant of events, which unavoidably give a reactive picture of media coverage. As indicated in our analysis earlier, proactive stories dominated the peace journalism frames in overall news coverage of the conflict. However, such could not possibly stop the media from paying attention to unprecedented events of the moments in the conflict, which turned out to be the reactive frames taking the highest toll of war journalism approach in media coverage of the conflict.

The next most prominent indicator of war journalism was the partisan stories, which took 137 (21.3%) of the salient indicators of war journalism in media coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. Virtually all the media networks framed partisan stories prominently. A story is considered partisan when it indicates bias for one side in a conflict. Bias can be located in a story when the story is found to focus on accounting for one side of conflicting parties.

Zero-sum stories was the third most prominent approach to war journalism (105 or 16.3%) in overall news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. A zero-sum frame will present conflict as a game whose goal is winning. Who the media supports in this game can be detected in the partisan frames, as we shall discuss in our findings later.

Variations in Approach to War Journalism within Networks

At the level of the individual networks, there were important variations in approach to war journalism framing. Distribution of approach to war journalism was made across 7 indicators of war journalism. The presentation here is based on the three most salient indicators of war journalism in each media network.

• Al-Jazeera English

Al-Jazeera English produced 115 (38.3%) war journalism stories. Out of the 115 war journalism stories, 34 (29.6%) focused on the "visible effects of war", which turned out to be the strongest indicator of war journalism in Al-Jazeera English coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. This was followed by reactive and partisan indicators of war journalism, which took 31 (27.0%) and 22 (19.1%) respectively of its approach to war journalism. A Story framed as "visible effects of war" will focus on death, destructions and injuries etc.

• BBC World

BBC world produced 165 (55.0%) war journalism stories. Out of the 165 war journalism stories, 41 (24.8%) stories were approached with the zero-sum frame, which turned out to be the BBC World's highest record of war journalism framing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. The second and third most prominent indicators of war journalism in the BBC World were partisan and reactive stories, which took 30 (18.2%) and 25 (15.2%) respectively of the network's frames of war journalism in the conflict.

• CNN International

CNN International produced 160 (53.3%) war journalism stories within the period investigated. Out of its 160 war journalism stories, 41 (25.6%) used the zero-sum approach, thus representing the highest indicator of war journalism manifest in CNN's coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was followed by two party-oriented stories, which accounted for 36 (22.5%) of the network's war journalism stories in the conflict. The third strongest indicator of war journalism in CNN's coverage of the conflict was partisan stories (25 or 15.6%).

Press TV

Press TV recorded the highest occurrence of war journalism in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated (203 or 67.7%). The network produced the most of reactive and partisan stories, which took 82 (40.4%) and 60 (29.6%) respectively of its coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. Importantly, elite-oriented stories which took 26 (12.8%) were also one of the three strongest indicators of war journalism in Press TV coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Differences in Approach to War Journalism between Networks

A close look at the distribution of approach to war journalism (Table 2) will show that the media networks were also similar in some respects. To statistically ascertain the comparisons, we probed further and obtained the following results.

• Press TV vs. BBC World

Press TV and the BBC World did not differ significantly in their approach to war journalism $x^2(36, n=300) = 28.241$, p=.818; $\varphi_c = .205$, p=.818. This outcome is not surprising because BBC World and Press TV had indicated strong similarities in framing reactive and partisan war journalism stories in their coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, not much difference is statistically expected in their approach to war journalism.

• Al-Jazeera English vs. BBC World Al-Jazeera English and the BBC World differed significantly in approach to war journalism $x^2(36, n=300) = 55.273, p<0.05; \varphi_c = .417, p<0.05$. As it turned out, Al-Jazeera English's emphasis on visible effects of war was a strong point of difference from the BBC World, which focused the most on zero-sum stories. The BBC World was also less reactive than Al-Jazeera English but more two-party-oriented than Al-Jazeera English in framing war journalism in the conflict.

• Press TV vs. CNN International

Result shows there was no significant difference in approach to war journalism between Press TV and CNN International $x^2(30, n=300) = 26.192, p=.665; \varphi_c = .217, p=.665$. Although the networks disagreed in framing two-party, zero-sum and eliteoriented stories, the disagreement actually did not seemed as important as their agreement in framing partisan stories.

• Al-Jazeera vs. CNN International

No evidence of a significant difference in approach to war journalism between Al-Jazeera English and CNN International was found $x^2(36, n=300) = 40.301, p=.286$; $\phi_c = .310, p=.286$. Areas of noticeable disagreement between the two networks were "visible effects of war", where Al-Jazeera had a lot of emphasis compared to CNN International; "zero-sum stories", where CNN International emphasized more than Al-Jazeera English; and "two-party-oriented" stories where CNN International also placed emphasis more than Al-Jazeera English. However, the differences are statistically not significant.

RQ3: Use of War Journalism Languages

Following the analysis on Table 3, a total of 798 related war journalism terms were used in global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. Of this amount, demonizing language terms were the most used (68.9%), followed by emotive language terms (22.4%). The most salient indicator of war journalism in terms of language use therefore was demonizing languages. The most avoided war journalism language, invariably the most salient indicator of peace journalism in terms of language use was the victimizing language, which took only 8.6% of the occurrence of related war journalism terms in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated.

The most common and predominant demonizing term used in news coverage of the conflict was "terrorist", which took 53.1% of the overall occurrence of war journalism terms and 77.1% of the distribution of demonizing language terms within the period investigated. All plural adjectives of the term e.g. terrorists, and its noun singular/plural e.g. terror(s), and verb tenses e.g. terrorize; terrorized; terrorizing were coded after their relatedness to the conflict were verified through key word in context (KWIC) analysis. This coding rule was applied to all the war journalism language terms analysed in the study. While related use of the term "terrorist" was common among the media networks, its usage context differs among the networks, as our key word in context analysis showed.

The most avoided victimizing language term was "destitute", which recorded 0% occurrence i.e. completely absent in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. This was closely followed by "defenceless" and "pathetic", each of which took 4.3% of the distribution of victimizing language terms, and 4.0%; 4.4% respectively of the occurrences of war journalism language terms in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated.

Although demonizing and emotive terms dominated war journalism language in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated, it is important to mention that some of the terms recorded minimal occurrences at their individual levels. For example, the term "barbaric" took 0.2% of the distribution of demonizing languages, and 0.1% of the occurrences of war journalism terms in global news coverage of the conflict within the period

\bigcirc
٢
Ę
ŝ
works
5
Ś
ىد
Ye.
ца.
Ч,
le
\geq
Ś
S
5
S
0
ő
60
Га
50
ũ
Б.
lism Languages acros
SI
÷
5
L.
n
Ы
ч
/a
\geq
f
0
SS
ğ
L.
Ľ
Ц
ರ
õ
\circ
ä
0
Ĩ
Tab
Ĥ
£ .

		Al-Jazeera English	BBC World News	CNN International	Press TV	Western Networks	Non-western Networks	All Networks
	Devastate	17 (51.5)^	2 (40)	0 (0.0) v	10 (90.9)^	2 (8.0)	27 (61.4)^	29 (42.1)
	Defenceless	v(0.0) 0	0 (0.0) v	2 (10)	1 (9.1)	2 (8.0)	1 (2.3)	3 (4.3)
Victimizing Lanonages	Pathetic	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	3 (15)	0 (0.0)	3 (12.0)	v (0.0) v	3 (4.3)
anno, ma	Destitute	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	v (0.0) v	v (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	v (0.0) v	v (0.0) v
	Tragedy	16(48.5)	3 (60)^	15 (75)^	0 (0.0) v	18 (72.0)^	16 (36.4)	34(49.3)^
		$\sum n = 33(100)^*$	$\sum n=5 (100)^*$	$\sum n = 20 (100)$ T = 4 40	$\sum n = 11(100)^*$	$\sum n=25 (100)^*$	$\sum n = 44 (100)^*$	$\sum n=69 (100)^*$
		S=2.030	S=2.191	S=1.095	S=.302	S=1.384	S=1.935	S=1.934
	Vicious	1 (1.3)	0 (0.0) v	4 (1.3)	0 (0.0)	4 (1.0)	1 (0.6)	5 (0.9)
	Cruel	1 (1.3)	1 (1.3)	1 (0.3)	3 (3.4)	2 (0.5)	4 (2.4)	6 (1.1)
Demonizino	Brutal	18 (23.4)	6 (7.7)	8 (2.6)	4 (4.5)	14 (3.6)	22 (13.3)	36 (6.5)
Languages	Barbaric	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0) v	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0) v	1 (0.2)
	Terrorist	43 (55.8)^	46 (59)^	276 (89.9)^	59 (67)^	322 (83.6)^	102 (61.8)^	424 (77.1)^
	Extremist	13 (16.9)	23 (29.5)	15 (4.9)	22 (25)	38 (9.9)	35 (21.2)	73 (13.3
	Fanatic	1 (1.3)	2 (2.6)	2 (0.7)	v (0.0) v	4 (1.0)	1 (0.6)	5 (0.9)
		$\sum n=77(100)^{**}$ T =9.64	$\sum n = 78(100)^{**}$ T = 10.15	$\sum n=307(100)^{**}$ T=9.94	$\sum n=88(100)^{**}$ T=10.06	$\sum n=385(100)^{**}$ T =9.99	$\sum n=1.65 (100)^{**}$ T=9.86	$\sum n=550 (100)^{**}$ T=9.95
		S=1.169	S=.898	S=.647	S=.862	S=.709	S=1.035	S=.822
	Fundamentalist	1 (1.6)	3 (7.9)	1 (5.3)	$0(0.0)^{v}$	4 (7.0)	1 (0.8)	5 (2.8)
	Massacre	17 (26.6)	4(10.5)	11 (57.9)^	2 (3.4)	15 (26.3)	19 (15.6)	34 (19.0)
Emouve Languages	Decimate	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	$0(0.0)^{v}$	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v	0 (0.0) v
00	Genocide	7 (10.9)	0 (0.0) v	1 (5.3)	1 (1.7)	1 (1.8)	8 (6.6)	9 (5.0)
	Assassinate	39 (60.9)^	31 (81.6)^	6 (31.6)	55 (94.8)^	37 (64.9)^	94 (77.4)^	131 (73.2)^
		$\sum n=64 (100)$	$\sum n=38 (100)$	$\sum n = 19 (100)^*$	$\sum n = 58(100)$	$\sum n=57 (100)$	$\sum n = 122 (100)$	$\sum n=179 (100)$
		S=1.357	S=1.364	S=1.491	S=.564	S=1.539	S=1.135	S=1.296
^v Most avoided w	^v Most avoided war terminology within languages		^ Most used war terminology within languages	within languages	* Most avoid	* Most avoided war languages **	** Most used war languages	ages

.

investigated. Similarly, the term "decimate" (emotive language) was completely avoided in global news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated.

Variations in Language Use within Networks

At the individual network levels, there were variations in use and avoidance of war journalism languages.

• Al-Jazeera English

In Al-Jazeera English, the most salient indicator of peace journalism in terms of language use was the victimizing language, which took 19% compared to the demonizing and emotive languages which took 44.2% and 36.8% respectively as the most salient indicators of war journalism in terms of language use within the network. Within the victimizing language, the most avoided terms were "defenceless", "pathetic" and "destitute" all of which were completely absent in Al-Jazeera English coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. The most prominent war language terms in Al-Jazeera English were "terrorist" and "assassinate". In our discussion we point out how usage of these terms differed between western and non-western networks.

• BBC World

In the BBC World, the most salient indicator of peace journalism in terms of avoidance of war journalism languages was also the victimizing language, which took 4.1% compared to the demonizing and emotive languages which took 64.5% and 31.4% respectively as the most salient indicators of war journalism in terms of language use within the network. Within the victimizing language, the most avoided terms were "defenceless", "pathetic" and "destitute" all of which were also completely absent in the BBC World news coverage of the conflict within the period investigated. "Terrorists", "extremists" and "assassinate" were the most used war journalism terms in the BBC World News coverage of the conflict.

• CNN International

In the CNN International, the most avoided war journalism language, invariably the most salient indicator of peace journalism in terms of language use was the emotive language, which took 5.5% compared to victimizing and demonizing languages which took 5.8% and 88.7% respectively as the most salient indicators of war journalism within the network. Within the emotive language, the most avoided term was "decimate", which was completely absent in CNN International's coverage of the conflict in the period investigated. The most prominent war journalism terms in CNN International coverage were "terrorist", "tragedy" and "massacre".

Press TV

Victimizing languages were also the most avoided in Press TV coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the period investigated. Victimizing languages took only 7% compared to the demonizing and emotive languages which took 56% and 37% respectively as the strongest indicators of war journalism in Press TV news. Within the victimizing language, the most avoided terms were "tragedy", "pathetic" and "destitute" all of which were completely absent in Press TV coverage of the conflict in the period investigated. The most featured war journalism terms in Press TV were "devastate", "terrorists", "extremists" and "assassinate".

DISCUSSION

As our data reveals, global news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still dominated by war journalism framing. However, we need to be cautious about generalization here, because a more careful look — particularly at the individual media networks shows there were important occurrences of peace journalism frames in the conflict. In Al-Jazeera English for example, we found a significantly higher amount of peace journalism than war journalism frames. This finding evidences an earlier survey in which El-Nawawy and Powers (2008) had found that viewers of Al-Jazeera English across the world perceives the network as "a conciliatory media that is likely to cover contentious issues in a way that contributes to creating an environment that is more conducive to cooperation, negotiation and reconciliation" (p.24-25). Of course this is not to say that Al-Jazeera English was free of bias in reporting the conflict. In fact pro-Palestinian partisan frames stood out as one of Al-Jazeera English strongest (19.1%) indicators of war journalism in its coverage of the conflict (Table 2).

In CNN International and the BBC World, peace journalism framing also contested tightly with war journalism framing to such extents that there were no statistical significance in the dominance of war journalism in both networks. Again this does not imply that CNN International and the BBC World were not biased in reporting the conflict, as pro-Israeli partisan frames took 15.6% and 18.2% of the networks' strongest indicators of war journalism respectively (Table 2). Press TV is the only network whose framing of peace journalism was significantly weaker than war journalism, and whose amount of (pro-Palestinian) partisan war journalism frames ranked highest (29.6%). Thus, the presence of bias cuts across the media networks, and leads to an important question as to whether or not the media can actually frame peace journalism on a neutral platform.

Drawing on the data we examined here, it seems peace journalism can be reflected adequately in media coverage of a conflict even when such media is biased. Two possible explanations can be offered here. The first is that media are not necessarily averse to peace. They therefore can consciously focus on aspects of a conflict that highlights or supports peace. The second is that the media can frame peace around the interest of a party in the conflict. This would seem like "political peace journalism" in which the media cleverly portrays one of the conflict parties as being interested in peace, without necessarily saying "more than" or portraying the other as being not interested in peace. For example CNN's story on October 2, 2011 titled "Israel supports call for talks with Palestinians". The emphasis in this study was Israel's interest in peace and its willingness to talk with Palestinian Authority. Although the story pointed out that Palestinian Authority had put up conditions for talks, this latent bias does not disqualify the story as a peace journalism frame because it focused on peace initiative.

The media may also focus its stories on aspects of a conflict that highlights peace concerns, but with framing that cleverly appeals to the negotiating terms of one of the conflict parties. For example BBC World's story published October 11, 2011 titled "Gilad Shalit: Israel and Hamas agree prisoner swap deal". Essentially this story focused on a movement toward peace in a specific issue, therefore not a war journalism frame, but the emphasis was on the need for such agreement because of an Israeli soldier whose life was very important to Israel and the family.

In a sincere content analysis, you cannot code a story that is dominated by peace frames as a war story, and if you code a peace story as a peace story despite latent skews such as above, the media in question is seen as having recorded a peace journalism framing. It therefore means that our evidence of peace journalism in media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not be hastened to mean that the media are doing dispassionately well in responding to shift from war journalism. The tendency for "political peace journalism" to emerge should rather be seen here.

This is particularly noticeable in the approach to peace journalism, which we coded as indicators of peace journalism. Taking the instance of the most common approach to peace journalism among the media networks – the proactive frames, we realised that the direction of proactive framing differed among the networks. Proactive stories in Press TV for example mainly took the direction of forecasting to prevent possible western or Israeli attack on Iran -attacks that may have its root in Iranian government's anti-Israeli stance. Example "Iran attack will drag ME into total chaos" (Press TV Nov. 6, 2011). This story was an attribution to French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, who had warned against military actions against Iran by the West. Of course a story like this is proactive as long as it suggests an attempt to prevent a war or expansion of it, but it was skewed towards the interest of Iran. Proactive stories in CNN International's coverage were mainly oriented towards softening actions against Israel—perhaps in such a way that further provocation of war will not occur. For example, CNN International reported "Israel to speed up settlement construction in Jerusalem, West Bank" (November 1, 2011). By stating that this announcement came "in retaliation" for UNESCO's vote to accept Palestinian bid for statehood, CNN seemed to have used this story to mildly point out the wrong of Israel, in case there are possible actions that could be taken to forestall violence that may follow in West Bank and East Jerusalem. Interestingly, the network immediately followed up on November 2, 2011 with another proactive softener "East Jerusalem construction not a punishment—Netanyahu". Proactive peace journalism frames in Al-Jazeera English were notably reflective of expression of regrets. Examples "Israel indicts soldier over Gaza" (March 12, 2010); "Israel expands Flotilla enquiry" (July 4, 2010). Stories like these coming from pro-Palestinian media is likely to be taken as a genuine report of Israel's "regret" over its attack on Gaza and Flotilla – certainly therefore proactive peace journalism frames, capable of forestalling violent reactions among Palestinians. What we are trying to point out here is that there is a tendency towards politicizing peace journalism in media coverage of conflict issues, such that the media might not necessarily be seen as not responding to the call for peace journalism but cleverly doing so in the context of partisanship.

Further evidences of this are observed in our data on the use of war journalism languages across the media networks. All the media networks, on the hand of war journalism, agree that some people, sometime, somewhere were "cruel" and "brutal" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that there are "terrorists" and "extremists". On the hand of peace journalism, they all agree that there was no "destitute" in the conflict, and there were not acts that "decimated" or intended to "decimate" any populations. But who was cruel; who was brutal; who are the terrorists; who are the extremists? The networks disagree in their answers to this question.

The BBC World and CNN International used "brutal" to describe attacks on Israel by Al-Qaeda and "Palestinian terrorists", while Press TV and Al-Jazeera English used "brutal" to describe how Israel was dealing with Palestinian prisoners and civilians in occupied territories. The BBC World used "extremist" to describe Arab political formations like Hesbollah, Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and the right-wing Jewish supporters of Palestinians. Al-Jazeera believes there are extremists, but that the term also describes the Jewish nationalist

movement. Press TV thinks the extremists are the "Israeli settlers" who engage in violent activities against Palestinian people and their properties.

Now who are the terrorists? Press TV think the United States of America is the "biggest" terrorist and the "biggest" sponsor of terrorist groups like Iraq-based party for Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK); Pakistan-based Jundallah and Iran-based Mujahedin-e Khalq, whose activities counters the interest of Iranian government at local and international levels. For CNN International, the terrorists are Palestinian groups like Hamas and individuals like Bin Laden (now late) who attacks Israel and the US. The BBC World has the same view as CNN International, but Al-Jazeera English would say Israel, US and European Union are the ones who say Hamas, Hesbollah and Al-Qaeda are terrorist groups even though the causes they fight are not really the terrorist.

Although war journalism is a familiar area, an interesting dimension we have been able to contribute in this paper is that we used the Galtung model to empirically demonstrate how war and peace have competed in western and non-western news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Again considering that there are important indications of peace journalism, we probed into how peace journalism is characterized and manipulated in the media. Disturbingly, we noticed what seems like "political peace journalism", which calls for further research the way media might represent bias in peace journalism.

NOTES

¹ Kressel N. J. (1987): Biased Judgment of Media Bias: A Case Study of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. *Political Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 2.* p. 212–213 contains an outline of the major findings that emanated from these studies.

REFERENCES

- Alimi, E. 2007. Discursive contention: Palestinian media discourse and the inception of the first Intifada. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 12 (4): 71-91.
- BBC. 2006. Report of the Independent Panel for the BBC Governors on the Impartiality of BBC Coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. April. http://folders.nottingham.edu. cn/staff/zlizrb/2009_IC_NMW/BBC_israelpalestine_panel_report_final_may06.pdf. (Retrieved on 26 July 2011)
- El-Nawawy, M. & S. Powers 2008. *Mediating Conflict: Al-Jazeera English and the Possibility of a Conciliatory Media* Los Angeles: FIGUEROA Press.
- Fahmy, S. & T. J. Johnson. 2007. Show the truth and let the audience decide: a web-based survey showing support among viewers of Aljazeera for the use of graphic imagery. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 51(2), 245+
- Galtung, J. 1998. Peace journalism: what, why, who, how, when, where. Presented at the TRANSCEND workshop "What are journalists for?" September 3–6. Taplow Court, UK.
- Hagos, A. 2001. Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi The Studio Ijambo Experience and Impact. Washington DC: MSI-USAID
- Howard, R. 2002. An Operational Framework for Media and Peace Building. Vancouver: Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society
- Kalb, M. & C Saivetz. 2007. Israeli-Hesbollah War of 2006: the media as a weapon in asymmetrical conflict. *The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics* 12(3): 43–66.

- Kandil, M.A. 2009. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in American, Arab and British media: corpus-based critical discourse analysis. PhD Dissertations paper 12, Georgia State University.
- Karim, M. 2009. BBC and Aljazeera coverage of Israeli-Palestinian violence. http://www. english.globalarabnetwork.com/200907011472/Media/study-bbc-a-al-jazeera-coverageof-israeli-palestinian-violence.html. (Retrieved on July 23, 2011)
- Kressel N. J. 1987. Biased judgment of media bias: a case study of the Arab-Israeli dispute. *Political Psychology*, 8(2): 212–213.
- Levin, D. 2003. Structure of news coverage of a peace process: a test of the indexing and zero-sum hypotheses. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 8(4): 27–53.
- Lopata, S. 2009. The media's role in post-conflict Liberia" Abstracts: *War, Media, and the Public Sphere. http://www.oeaw.ac.at/cmc/wmps/pdf/lopata.pdf.* (Retrieved on 31 March, 2010)
- McGoldrick, A., & J. Lynch 2000. Peace journalism How to do it. http://www.transcend. org/pjmanual.htm. (Retrieved on March 13, 2003)
- Paluck, E. L. 2007. Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict with the mass media: a field experiment in Rwanda. PhD Dissertation, Faculty of the Graduate School of the Yale University Philo, G. & M. Berry. 2004. *Bad News from Israel*. London: Pluto Press
- Raz, H. 2008. Comparative media system: Haaretz, Aljazeera and CNN coverage of Israel-Palestinian conflict. http://islammediaandthewest.blogspot.com/2008/12/comparativemedia-systems-me-media.html. (Retrieved on 12 January, 2011)
- Ruigrok, N. 2008. Journalism of attachment and objectivity: Dutch journalists and the Bosnian War. *Media, War and Conflict* 1(3) December 2008.
- Stemler, S. 2001. An overview of content analysis. *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation,* 7(17). http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17. (Retrieved September 10, 2010)
- Tehranian, M. 2002. Peace journalism: negotiating global media ethics. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 7 (2): 58-83.
- Tsfati, Y. & J. Cohen. 2005. Democratic consequences of hostile media perceptions: the case of Gaza settlers. *The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics* 10(4): 28-51.
- Viser, M. 2003. Attempted objectivity: an analysis of the New York Times and Ha'aretz and their Portrayals of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 8(4): 114–120.
- Warshel, Y. 2007. "As Though there is peace": opinions of Jewish-Israeli Children about watching Rechov Sumsum/Shara'a Simsim Amidst Armed Political Conflict. *The Communication Initiative Network* June 22, 2007. http://www.comminit.com/en/ print/72338. (Retrieved on 30 August, 2010)
- Wolfsfeld, G. 2004. Media and the Path of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wu, H. D., J. Sylvester, & J. M. Hamilton. 2002. Newspaper provides balance in Palestinian/ Israeli reports. Newspaper Research Journal, 23 (2/3): 6–17.